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Abstract
In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and abil-
ity presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the in-
tended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily
regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philo-
sophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining
Elgesem’s modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with dif-
ferent flavours.
1 Introduction
Modal logic of agency is a traditional research field in philosophical logic
(for a modern history of this field see [32]). Roughly speaking, the approach
adopts the general policy to abstract from making explicit state changes
and from considering the temporal dimension in describing actions. In fact,
actions are simply taken to be relationships between agents and states of
affairs. Thus, the conceptual qualification of these relations is made by using
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suitable modal operators to represent, for example, that an agent “brings it
about” or “sees to it” that A, or that such agent is “able” to realise A, or
again that she “attempts” to achieve it.
It is well known that modal logic of agency has a number of drawbacks.
As recently summarised in [33], the main limit of this approach, as found
in the literature, is that it is “too abstract”. For example, it does not usu-
ally capture the difference between the modal qualifications “sees to it” and
“brings it about”. Both expressions are in general represented by modal
operators with the same logical properties, despite the fact that the former
exhibits a clear intentional character, whereas the latter may refer as well to
unintentional actions [15]; thus the addition of a modal operator for intention
is required to disambiguate the two readings [13].
Secondly, for the purpose of analysing the structure of multi-agent con-
texts it is crucial to distinguish between direct actions and indirect actions.
This is necessary, for example, to account for the notions of influence and
control of an agent over other agents [18, 19, 28, 29]. While these problems
may be, or have been, solved by providing suitable integrations and new op-
erators within the same paradigm of modal logic of agency, a last drawback
is inherent in the paradigm as such. In fact, “sometimes it is essential to
be able to refer to the means by which an agent brings about a state of
affairs”, as for example by referring to specific actions performed to achieve
a goal [33]. As is well known, this shows that modal logic of agency is less
expressive than other formal theories of action, such as dynamic logics. On
the other hand, this last limit is also an advantage. Although the abstract-
ness of modal logic of agency does not make the language very expressive in
itself, it allows flexibility for the easy combination of agency with a number
of other concepts, such as powers, obligations, beliefs, etc, in a multi-modal
setting. This perhaps explains why the approach has been recently used to
analyse some crucial aspects of normative and institutional domains (see,
e.g., [5, 11, 12, 18, 19, 28, 29]).
The formal properties of modal logic of agency have been extensively
investigated, and a number of variants and axiomatisations can be found in
literature (see, e.g., [2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32]). Despite this
great variety, it is possible to identify a minimal core of axioms that seem to
characterise indisputably some aspects of agency. The recent contributions
by Dag Elgesem are meant to work in this direction [8, 9].
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we rehearse the basic
notions for a modal logic of agency and ability; then in Section 3 we present
the account given by Elgesem: in particular we will introduce the class of
selection function models proposed by Elgesem to explain, semantically, the
notions of agency and ability based on a goal directed interpretation of such
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concepts; we also discuss the corresponding axiomatisation. As we will see,
the semantics validates the formula ¬C⊥, whose interpretation is that no
agent has the ability to realise the impossible. However, in Section 5 we show
that ¬C⊥ cannot be derived from the axiom system presented in Section 3.
To this end, we introduce neighbourhood semantics, we prove that there is a
class of neighbourhood models characterising the axiom system, and we build
a model falsifying ¬C⊥. As a consequence, the proposed axiomatisation
is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. Moreover we give
conditions to transform a neighbourhood model into an equivalent selection
function model and the other way around. It turns out that we can restore
completeness by adding ¬C⊥ as an additional axiom. This leaves us with
two logics: one with ¬C⊥ and one without it. Accordingly, we discuss,
in Section 4, some philosophical issues related to the interpretation of the
notion of ability when one accepts or rejects the above formula. Since both
logics are intuitively acceptable given the proper interpretations, in Section
6 we investigate whether it is possible to regain completeness for the logic
without ¬C⊥ using the type of models proposed by Elgesem. To this end we
have to introduce, in an implicit manner, non-normal possible worlds (i.e.,
worlds with “special” conditions to evaluate formulas). As we will argue
this is against the very own idea of the neighbourhood and selection function
semantics; thus in Section 7 we develop a new type of relational (Kripke-style)
possible world semantics with non-normal worlds, and we prove soundness
and completeness for the two logics of agency and ability with respect to this
semantics. We conclude the paper (Section 8) with a brief discussion about
the choice of semantics for modal logics and we give some hints for further
philosophical and technical investigations.
The focal point of the paper revolves around the incompleteness of the
logic proposed by Elgesem with respect to the intended semantics. This has
interesting ramifications on both philosophical and technical issues. Philo-
sophically our analysis may shed light on different meanings of agency while,
technically, it opens questions on the intuitive appeal of different types of
possible world semantics.
2 Modal Logic of Agency and Ability
We will focus here on two praxeological notions among those considered by
Elgesem1. The first is the idea of personal and direct action to realise a
1As we will see in a few moments, the two concepts are those of “bring about” and
“practical ability”. Elgesem formalises them as Does and Ability respectively, such that
both operators are, as expected, indexed by agents. For the sake of simplicity, we will
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state of affairs. In the mentioned general view, this idea is formalised by the
well-known modal operator E, such that a formula like EiA means that the
agent i brings it about that A. Elgesem’s logic of E is a classical non-normal
system [7], namely is closed under logical equivalence, and is characterised
by the following schemas.
EiA→ A (1)
(1) is recognised as valid by almost all theories of agency. It is nothing but the
usual axiom T of modal logic, and it expresses the successfulness of actions
that is behind the common reading of “bring about” concept.
¬Ei> (2)
The axiom (2), also named No, is used to capture the very concept of agency
at hand, according to which the occurrence of any state of affairs, in the
scope of Ei, is the (causal) result of an action of i. In other words, if i
had not behaved in the way she did, the world might have been different.
This means that an agent i can only realise something which is potentially
avoidable. In this perspective, no agent can bring about what is logically
unavoidable. Accordingly > cannot be realised with any contribution of i
because its occurrence is (causally) independent of any action of i.
(EiA ∧ EiB)→ Ei(A ∧B) (3)
This third schema, C or Agglomeration, follows from the co-temporality of
actions implicitly assumed within the paradigm of modal logic of agency. In
fact, if the agent i realises A and B, presumably by performing two distinct
actions, it can be also said that i brings it about that A ∧B only if the two
actions have been performed at the same time. As it is argued by Elgesem,
however, the converse of (3) must be rejected because, in presence of it,
substitution of equivalents (i) plus (2) make the logic inconsistent whenever
at least one action is performed, (ii) gives the usual rule RM (` A → B/ `
2A→ 2B), which is not acceptable in the logic for E [8, 9].
Notice that this minimal core of principles has been recognised also by
[28, 29]. The main difference between them and Elgesem regards the char-
acterisation of the interplay and influence between more agents. In [28, 29]
it is accepted
EiEjA→ ¬EiA (4)
adopt a different notation, which is quite common in the literature (see, e.g., [19]). Thus
the first is represented by the operator E, while the second by C. Of course, both are
labelled by agents as well.
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to emphasise that a formula like EiA strongly expresses the idea that the
agent i brings it about that A directly and personally : If i makes so that j
brings it about that A, then it is not possible to say that i realises A, since
such a state of affairs is achieved directly by j. More weakly, but in a similar
perspective, Elgesem simply rejects the schema
EiEjA→ EiA (5)
which is adopted, for example, by Chellas [6].
The second praxeological concept, analysed by Elgesem and considered
here, is agents’ “practical ability” to realise states of affairs. This praxeolog-
ical qualification is represented by the modal operator C. Accordingly, CiA
expresses that i is capable of realising A. The logic for C is quite weak. It is
closed as well under logical equivalence and is characterised by the following
principles.
EiA→ CiA (6)
This schema states a strong connection between ability and agency: If i
realises successfully A, it is obvious that i is able to do this.
¬Ci> (7)
This last axiom is the natural counterpart of schema (2) for E. As we have
alluded to, both express jointly the idea of avoidability, namely that the
occurrence of a state of affairs cannot be caused by one agent if the goal
obtains in every state of the world2.
In the next sections we will analyse some aspects of Elgesem’s semantics
for the above operators. The focus will be then on a decisive, but quite
solvable, problem arising from his own semantic characterisation of the logic
of agency and ability.
2According to Elgesem, the full idea of avoidability requires to focus on two different,
but interconnected, aspects. The first corresponds to the negative conditions stated by (2)
and (7). Both schemas are aimed to state that no agent brings about logical truths. The
second claim is that “an agent’s behaviour, when he brings about something, is instru-
mental in the production of that which he brings about”. This general idea corresponds to
saying, positively and with respect to any state of affairs A, that “if the agent had not be-
haved in the way he did when he brought it about that A, then he might not have brought
it about that A”. The last requirement is rendered by defining suitable dyadic operators
and principles which reflect Elgesem’s own philosophical interpretation of agency [9]. This
second aspect will not be considered here, since it does not seem relevant with regard to
the aims of this paper.
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3 An Axiomatisation for Agency and Ability
Elgesem’s analysis starts from semantical considerations [8, 9]. His aim is to
give a fresh account of Sommerhoff’s theory of goal-directness. The semantics
is given in terms of selection function models, where a selection function
model E is a structure
〈W, f, v〉 (8)
where W is a (non empty) set of possible worlds, f is a selection function
with signature P(W ) ×W 7→ P(W ), and v assigns to each propositional
letter a subset of W .3
Each formula corresponds to a set of worlds, the set of worlds where it is
true, and a world describes the formulas true at it; thus a formula corresponds
to a state of affairs, and it determines all worlds where the state of affairs is
true. The selection function identifies then the worlds relative to the actual
world where a goal (state of affairs) has been realised.
For convenience, before providing the valuation clauses for the formulas,
we define the notion of truth set, i.e., the set of worlds where a formula is
true.
Definition 1. Let M be a model and A be a formula. The truth set of A
wrt to M , ‖A‖M is thus defined:
‖A‖M = {w ∈ W : w M A} .
An Elgesem model is a selection function model E satisfying the following
valuation clauses (from now on, whenever clear from the context we drop
subscripts and superscripts):
S1. w E p iff w ∈ v(p);
S2. w E ¬A iff w 6E A;
S3. w E A→ B iff w 6E A or w E B;
3Elgesem’s semantics for the modal logic of agency and ability is a structure
〈W, f1, . . . , fn, V 〉 (cf. [9, p. 20] and [8, p. 54]), where each fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a func-
tion as in (8) and i is an agent. Since there are no interactions among the agents and all
functions fi are independent from each other and obey the same conditions, we can restrict
ourselves to the case of a single agent. Elgesem also considers some foundational aspects
of the notions he deals with and introduces some additional functions in order to capture
the idea of avoidability and accidence. However those functions do not play any relevant
role in the characterisation of the modal operators E and C. The valuation function and
the constraints on the model are given in terms of properties of f . The other functions are
used to specify constraints on concrete instances of f . Finally V is a valuation function
while v is an assignment.
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S4. w E EA iff w ∈ f(‖A‖E , w);
S5. w E CA iff f(‖A‖E , w) 6= ∅.
The notion of truth in a model and validity are defined as usual.
It is immediate to see that (S4) and (S5) together imply the validity of
(6), namely
EA→ CA.
Notice that Elgesem uses only one selection function to represent the two
modal operators E and C. This is crucial in his philosophical approach to
agency because f(‖A‖, w) corresponds exactly to the set of worlds where an
agent realises her ability, relative to the actual world w, to bring about the
goal A. In this perspective, ability and agency are two facets of the same
general concept.
Then Elgesem goes on and discusses the conditions required to charac-
terise the modal operators of agency (E) and ability (C); though the two
operators are defined by the same selection function, he treats them as in-
dependent operators (even if C corresponds to the possibility operator of
E, they are not duals, and cannot be defined in terms of each other in the
present setting).
To characterise the other principles Elgesem imposes the following con-
ditions on the selection function f :
E1 f(W,w) = ∅;
E2 f(X,w) ∩ f(Y,w) ⊆ f(X ∩ Y,w).
E3 f(X,w) ⊆ X;
Condition E1 says that a goal that is realised in every world is not a state the
agent is able to bring about. As an immediate consequence of this constraint
we have the validity of (7) and (2).
Condition E2, corresponding to the agglomeration principle for E (3), is
motivated by the idea that the ability needed for the intersection of A and
B is not more general than the ability to do A and the ability to do B.
Finally E3 makes explicit the idea that in all worlds where an agent
realises his/her ability to bring about a goal the goal is indeed realised. It is
easy to see that it validates the success principle (1).
To sum up, let us recall synoptically Elgesem’s axiomatisation for the
logic of agency and ability (let us call the resulting logic L1).
A0 propositional logic
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A1 ¬C>,
A2 EA ∧ EB → E(A ∧B),
A3 EA→ A,
A4 EA→ CA;
plus Modus Ponens and
A ≡ B
EA ≡ EBREE
A ≡ B
CA ≡ CBREC (9)
As we have seen, Elgesem also considers the principle ¬E>; however this
principle is redundant since it can be easily derived from A1 and the contra-
positive of A4.
Another interesting principle, which can be derived from the success ax-
iom for the operator E (A3) is
¬E⊥ (10)
This principle states that nobody can realise an inconsistent (impossible)
state. But, what about the corresponding principle that nobody is capable
to produce an inconsistent state?
¬C⊥ (11)
This principle is valid in the proposed selection function semantics, but, as
we shall see, is not provable in L1.
Let E be an Elgesem model. For every world w in E we have
w E ¬C⊥ ⇐⇒ w 6E C⊥
⇐⇒ f(‖⊥‖E , w) = ∅.
According to condition E3
∀w ∈ W, f(X,w) ⊆ X
and, ‖⊥‖E = ∅; hence
f(‖⊥‖E , w) ⊆ ‖⊥‖E = ∅.
According to the intended interpretation, ¬C⊥ means that an agent is not
able to realise the impossible (here with impossible we understand an in-
consistent state of affairs). This reading seems appropriate in a physical
(practical) conception of the notion of ability. However, there are other in-
terpretations where such condition might be relaxed. For example Hintikka
8
[16] proposes a reading where impossible worlds are worlds where we have a
partial knowledge of the structure of the world and some contradictions do
not appear to be as such, unless we perform a deeper analysis of them.
In the next section we will provide some brief philosophical comments on
whether adopting or rejecting schema (11).
4 Impossible Ability?
The interpretation assigned by Elgesem to the “bringing about” operator
is that the agent realises a state of affair A by practically or causally con-
tributing to its occurrence [9, pp. 19ff.]. More precisely, Elgesem says that
agent’s actions be causally necessary conditions for the goal-event A to occur.
Agent’s actions are of course necessary but not sufficient because the effec-
tive realisation of A depends also on some environmental factors, namely,
on external circumstances that allow for the exercise of agent’s ability to
achieve A. Within this specific background, and taking into account that
we are dealing with successful actions, it seems obvious that the notion of
avoidability should characterise agency because it does not make sense that
an agent practically contributes to the occurrence of >, this last being un-
avoidable: the occurrence of > is entirely independent of any action of the
agent. For similar –and perhaps stronger– reasons, ¬E⊥, which is a the-
orem in Elgesem’s axiomatisation as is trivially derived from EA → A, is
reasonable because it is an absurdity that an agent successfully realises the
impossible, which, by definition, cannot be practically or causally realised.
What about the notion of practical ability? The idea of avoidability
should also be applied, as Elgesem does, to the operator C: the occurrence
of a state of affairs A cannot be caused by one agent if the goal obtains in
every state of the world. But a similar rationale should be adopted also when
the goal is ⊥ and, in fact, we will show that (11) is technically required in
Elgesem’s axiomatisation.4 But let us forget for a while that Elgesem’s logic is
incomplete without (11). Hence, the question is: In which sense does an agent
have the ability to cause the occurrence of the impossible? Here the point
may be more subtle than it appears. As we know, in virtue of (6), agency
implies ability since any action of an agent realising A is successful and the
occurrence of A depends on her action: if I realise A this requires that I am
4In fact, the general idea of avoidability is often linked with rejecting the ability to
realize the impossible. This view is maintained, in a way, by Mark Brown in [4, p. 18],
where the author argues that the ability to realise ⊥ makes sense only in bizarre-sounding
examples in which, for any goal A, the agent, though able to do A, is prevented to realise
it for all possible situations.
9
able to do it. This is obvious and, in fact, given E⊥ → C⊥, we cannot infer
by detachment C⊥ since E⊥ is equivalent to ⊥. However, if all performed
actions require a corresponding ability, this does not require that all abilities
are exercised: the domain of abilities just includes that of actions. We may
argue thus that there is a state of affairs, say A, such that some agents
are able to realise it, but that cannot be effectively realised. What does this
mean? Bear in mind that the idea that an agent can effectively realise a state
of affairs may be obtained as the combination of ability plus opportunity: an
agent having the ability to do A may be prevented by circumstances from
exercising this ability (see also [20]). On this interpretation, the ability to do
⊥ can be viewed as an ability such that, for all kind of circumstances, these
last prevent any agent to exercise such an ability. Notice that, in Elgesem’s
analysis, the opportunity to do something excludes that this can be ⊥. In
fact in Elgesem’s logic [9, pp. 33 and 35] we have
¬OpportunityiEi⊥ (12)
which is equivalent to
¬Opportunityi⊥ (13)
In other words no agent “can effectively” do the impossible.
But the question, again, is: Does it make sense to maintain that a state
of affairs A cannot be practically realised because all possible circumstances
prevent the exercise of the ability to do A? The impression is that such an
ability is void: that all possible circumstances prevent to realise A means
that there is no circumstance that allows any agent to realise A (cf., [4,
p. 18]). Therefore, the idea of having such an ability is meaningless and so
the schema (11) is required.
In a more general perspective, we can add what Anthony Kenny [21,
p. 214] writes about the impossibility to realise >:
The President of the United States has the power to destroy
Moscow, i.e., to bring it about that Moscow is destroyed; but
he does not have the power to bring it about that either Moscow
is destroyed or Moscow is not destroyed. [. . . ] [T]he power to
bring it about that either p or not p is one which philosophers,
with the exception of Descartes, have denied even to God.
As we tried to argue, this impossibility can be extended also to impossible
states of affairs.
However, this is not the end of the story. Things may change when we
assign to E and C a different meaning and we go beyond the idea of practical
agency.
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We may have a first exception when we deal with the idea of normative
agency. In this perspective, the role of the schema ¬C⊥ can be debated
if Elgesem’s logic of agency is combined, as done in recent works on norm-
governed agent systems, with deontic notions [5, 11, 12, 18, 19, 29]. A more
extensive discussion of the interpretation of C would be to study it with
regard to normative/deontic capability. We will confine ourselves to some
short remarks. Indeed there are interpretations where ¬C⊥ is not an appro-
priate axiom. In many deontic logics the schema ¬O⊥ obtains and is meant
to avoid the absurdity of norms that oblige to do something contradictory:
these norms are useless since regulate something self-contradictory and be-
cause they cannot be accomplished with. In fact, it is quite common in the
literature to assume (implicitly or explicitly) that the nature of norms is that
they must be accomplishable [24].
In this context we may start from assuming that expressions such as COA
and EOA mean respectively that an agent can draft a norm OA, and that
the agent effectively issues OA (remember that E is a successful operator).
However, since norms are the result of the exercise of a certain power, nothing
in theory prevents a legislator to draft a norm like “it is obligatory to smoke
and not to smoke”.5 It may be argued that the absurdity resides here in
the obligation itself and not in the fact that such an obligation has been
drafted. If this is reasonable, we may impose to have rational norms, and
a consistent normative system, without having a rational legislator. This
view makes explicit a possible way of distinguishing practical agency from
normative agency: in fact, each of us, if legislator, can draft absurd norms
whereas none of us is able to physically realise a state of affairs such as “I
smoke and I do not smoke”. If norms are required to be consistent (axiom
D: OA → PA in case of normal modal deontic operator, or ¬O⊥), then
O⊥ is equivalent to ⊥ and so we have that C⊥ is consistent; hence (11)
has to be rejected as a valid principle. This is indeed a possibility that we
could admit, but, of course, we would presuppose a different conception of
agency. If we move from C to E we will notice that EO⊥ is equivalent to
⊥. This means that an agent (legislator) has the ability (power) to draft an
inconsistent norm without making the normative system inconsistent. On
the contrary, the legislator cannot issue, namely, make valid, an inconsistent
norm without generating a contradiction within the normative system. To
sum up, rejecting ¬C⊥ and adopting ¬O⊥ permits to distinguish between
drafting norms and effectively issuing them within the normative system.
5The notions at hand in this interpretation are closely related to the long-standing
problem of the validity of norms in a normative system; for a logical account, see, among
others, the seminal work by Alchourro´n and Bulygin [1].
11
Other exceptions may be put forward when we try to use the notion of
agency within more specific, and perhaps unexpected, contexts.
A somehow related interpretation arises in computer science where C,
and E can be understood, respectively, as the permission (capability) to is-
sue a computer instruction (let us say a syntactically correct line of code
in a program), and to execute a computer instruction. In this reading ⊥
corresponds to an illegal instruction, let us say a division by zero or an oper-
ation where two different values are assigned, at the same time, to one and
the same memory register, which causes the system to crash, or a condition
that violates some integrity constraints. In this interpretation C⊥ is clearly
consistent since the mere fact that a potentially dangerous instruction has
been inserted in some program does not imply that the instruction is actually
executed by the interpreter or the compiler.
Similarly, in mathematics, C can be interpreted as an act of defining a
property and E as an effective construction for the property. It is possible
to provide a definition with an empty extension (thus corresponding to ⊥,
but then it is not possible to give any effective construction for such notion).
For example, given the domain of rational numbers, any two rational num-
bers such that x 6= y, we define that x divides y iff ∃z(x · z = y). Hence
C(divides(0, 1)) is consistent, since it corresponds to the definition just given,
while E(divides(0, 1)) would be true if we can provide a number z such that
0 · z = 1; according to the axioms governing multiplication in this domain we
have ∀x(0 ·x = 0), from which we derive divides(0, 1) ≡ ⊥. From the axioms
governing E we have E⊥ → ⊥, and finally ¬E⊥, and so E(divides(0, 1)) is
always false. We are aware that the parallelism between ability and agency,
on the one hand, and defining and calculating in mathematics, on the other,
may not convince the reader. In fact, such a comparison should be tested
with regard to the full axiomatisation we could adopt in providing a precise
support of this new reading of agency and ability. We will not enter here
into further details. In our view, this last case can be roughly understood
by applying the same intuition that is behind the previous example, which
concerns computer science.
5 Neighbourhood Models
As we have seen in the previous section ¬C⊥ is valid, but, as we will see, it
is not provable from L1, hence L1 is incomplete wrt the intended semantics.
To show that L1 is incomplete wrt E we have to provide a class of models
such that L1 is complete for it and ¬C⊥ is false. While it is possible to
devise a class of selection function models for L1 (see Section 6) we prefer to
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introduce models with a different structure. As we shall see, the difference
between the two types of semantics is just in the intuition behind them; in
fact, mathematically, they are equivalent and both neighbourhood semantics
and selection function semantics are also known as Scott-Montague semantics
(cf. [14]).
A neighbourhood model N is a structure
〈W,NC , NE, v〉
where W is a set of possible worlds, NC and NE are functions from W to
P(P(W )), and v assigns subsets of W to atomic letters.
The valuation clauses for atomic and boolean formulas are as usual while
those for modal operators are given below.
Definition 2. Let w be a world in N = 〈W,NC , NE, v〉:
N1 w N CA iff ‖A‖N ∈ NCw ;
N2 w N EA iff ‖A‖N ∈ NEw .
It is natural to add some conditions on the functions N in neighbourhood
models to validate the axioms A1–A4.
C1 W /∈ NCw ;
C2 if X ∈ NEw and Y ∈ NEw then X ∩ Y ∈ NEw ;
C3 if X ∈ NEw then w ∈ X;
C4 NEw ⊆ NCw .
Theorem 3. `L1 A iff N A.
Proof. We provide the proof only for the correspondence between A4 and
C4. For the other axioms and semantic conditions see [7, 30].
For the soundness part we have to show that axiom A4 is valid. Let
us suppose it is not. Then there is a model satisfying conditions C1–C4,
and that falsifies it; that is, there is a world w such that w 6 EA → CA.
This means (1) w  EA and (2) w 6 CA. From (1) we obtain ‖A‖ ∈ NEw ,
and then, by the inclusion condition C4, ‖A‖ ∈ NCw , but from (2) we have
‖A‖ /∈ NCw . Hence we get a contradiction.
For the completeness part let us consider the minimal canonical neigh-
bourhood model Nmin for L1. Nmin is defined as follows:
• W is the set of all L1-maximal consistent sets,
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• NEw = {[A] : EA ∈ w},
• NCw = {[A] : CA ∈ w},
• w  p iff p ∈ w,
where [A] = {w ∈ W : A ∈ w}, and NC and NE satisfy conditions C1–C4.
Again we prove only the case for A4 and C4. Since the worlds in W are
L1-maximal consistent sets, for any world w we have that either (1) EA ∈ w
or (2) ¬EA ∈ w.
For (1) we have
EA ∈ w iff [A] ∈ NEw
and, by the inclusion condition C4, [A] ∈ NCw ; but
[A] ∈ NCw iff CA ∈ w.
Hence, both EA and CA are in w; therefore EA→ CA ∈ w.
On the other hand if (2) is the case, we can use the tautology ¬EA →
(EA→ CA) to conclude that EA→ CA ∈ w.
In both cases EA→ CA ∈ w, and by the properties of canonical models
we have `L1 EA→ CA. 2
It is easy to provide a neighbourhood model that falsifies ¬C⊥. Let W =
{w}, NEw = ∅ and NCw = {∅}. Here, ‖⊥‖ = ∅ ∈ NCw , therefore w  C⊥ and
w 6 ¬C⊥. Hence we have the following result:
Proposition 4. 6`L1 ¬C⊥.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4 is that L1 is incomplete with
respect to the intended selection function semantics E . It is possible, how-
ever, to regain completeness by adding ¬C⊥ as axiom to L1 (let us call the
resulting logic L2).
Proposition 5. Let N ′ = 〈W,NE, NC , v〉 a neighbourhood model and E =
〈W, f, v〉 be an Elgesem model satisfying the following conditions:
1. w ∈ f(‖A‖E , w) iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NEw ; and
2. f(‖A‖E , w) 6= ∅ and ‖A‖E 6= W iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NCw .6
Then
E A iff N ′ A.
Moreover E satisfies conditions E1, E2 and E3 iff N ′ satisfies conditions
C1–C4, and ∅ /∈ NCw , for every w ∈ W .
6The condition that ‖A‖E 6= W is due to the axiom A1, which requires it.
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Proof. Since the two models have the same worlds and the same assignment,
clearly the two models agree on the valuation of propositional formulas. For
the modal operators E and C we have
w E EA iff w ∈ f(‖A‖E , w)
iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NEw
iff w N ′ EA
and
w E CA iff f(‖A‖E , w) 6= ∅ and ‖A‖E 6= W
iff ‖A‖N ′ ∈ NCw
iff w N ′ CA
For the other property we reason as follows: for every world w of E we have
f(‖⊥‖E , w) ⊆ ‖⊥‖E = ∅, so f(‖⊥‖E , w) = ∅, and from the relationships be-
tween the two models we obtain ∅ /∈ NCw . The other direction is immediate.2
The above proposition shows that any selection function models can be trans-
formed into equivalent neighbourhood models. However such models must
satisfy the condition
C5 ∀w, ∅ /∈ NCw ,
which is known to correspond to the axiom ¬C⊥. Hence we have the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 6.
1. `L2 A iff N ′ A;
2. `L2 A iff E A.
The above theorem proves that E does not determine L1 but L2 (i.e., L1+
¬C⊥). In the next section we will investigate whether there is a class of
selection function models that characterises L1.
6 Completeness Regained
In the previous section we have seen that it is possible to regain completeness
by using neighbourhood semantics with two neighbourhood functions, one
for C (NC) and one for E (NE) plus the condition that NE is included
in NC . Obviously, by the well-known equivalence between selection function
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semantics and neighbourhood semantics [14], we can use a semantics with two
selection functions; but what about a selection function semantics with only
a common selection function for the two operators? The answer is positive,
and in the rest of this section we show how to modify the conditions on the
selection function f to recover completeness7. All we have to do is to replace
condition E3 with the following condition:
F1 If ‖A‖ 6= ∅, then, for all w, f(‖A‖, w) ⊆ ‖A‖; otherwise w /∈ f(‖A‖, w).
It is immediate to give a counter-model for ¬C⊥: Let W = {w1, w2} and
f(∅, w1) = {w2}. Since f(∅, w1) 6= ∅, and w1 /∈ f(∅, w1) we have that w1 
C⊥.
As a first result for this semantics we show that axioms are valid in it
and the inference rules preserve validity.
We use S to denote an Elgesem model that satisfies condition F1.
Theorem 7. If `L1 A then S A.
Proof. Clearly all propositional tautologies are valid and Modus Ponens pre-
serves validity.
Axiom EA→ A. Let w be world in W . If ‖A‖ 6= ∅ then f(‖A‖, w) ⊆ A,
and this is the well-known condition for this axiom to be valid, and thus true
at w.
If ‖A‖ = ∅, then w /∈ f(‖A‖, w). But in this case w 6 EA, and then
w  EA→ A.
Axiom EA→ CA. Let w be world inW . If ‖A‖ 6= ∅ then f(‖A‖, w) ⊆ A.
If  EA, then w ∈ f(‖A‖, w); hence f(‖A‖, w) 6= ∅, w  CA. Therefore
w  EA→ CA.
If ‖A‖ = ∅, then w /∈ f(‖A‖, w). But in this case w 6 EA, and then
w  EA→ CA.
Axiom ¬C>. This axiom is independent from the new condition.
Axiom EA ∧ EB → E(A ∧ B). Condition E2 takes care of the majority
of cases, but we have to be careful since it is possible that the conjunction
of A and B is inconsistent.
If w  EA ∧EB, then w ∈ ‖EA ∧EB‖; thus w ∈ ‖EA‖ ∩ ‖EB‖, which
means that w ∈ f(‖A‖, w) and w ∈ f(‖B‖, w). According to condition F1
we have
‖A‖ 6= ∅ and ‖B‖ 6= ∅, (14)
7Elgesem [8] claims that his logic is complete. However the proof is only sketched. To
the best of our knowledge this paper provides the first full proof of completeness for L1
and L2 with respect to Elgesem models.
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which implies that f(‖A‖, w) ⊆ ‖A‖ and f(‖B‖, w) ⊆ ‖B‖. On the other
hand, it is possible that ‖A∧B‖ = ∅, which means that w /∈ f(‖A∧B‖, w). If
this is the case then ‖A‖∩‖B‖ = ∅; Consequently f(‖A‖, w)∩f(‖B‖, w) = ∅.
On the other hand, if ‖A‖ = ∅ (or ‖B‖ = ∅) then ‖A ∧ B‖ = ∅ and so
f(‖A‖, w) = f(‖A ∧B‖, w).
A ≡ B iff ‖A‖ = ‖B‖. In particular, if ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = ∅, then f(‖A‖, w) =
f(‖B‖, w). 2
The proof for the completeness is based on canonical models.
Definition 8. A selection function canonical model is a structure Sc =
〈W, f, v〉 such that:
• W is the set of all L1-maximal consistent sets;
• v is an Elgesem valuation function such that, for all atomic proposition
p, w  p iff p ∈ w.
• f :P(W )×W 7→P(W ) is thus defined:
– if CA /∈ w, then f([A]Sc , w) = ∅; otherwise
– if [A]Sc = ∅, then f([A]Sc , w) =W − {w},
– if [A]Sc 6= ∅, then f([A]Sc , w) = [EA]Sc .
where [A]Sc , the membership set of a formula A, is defined as follows:
[A]Sc = {w ∈ W : A ∈ w}.
An immediate consequence of the above construction and Lindenbaum’s
Lemma is the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let Sc be a canonical selection function model 〈W, f, v〉,
then:
• [A]Sc = ∅ iff A ≡ ⊥;
• |W | > 1;
• If A 6≡ > and A 6≡ ⊥, then [EA]Sc 6= ∅.
Lemma 10. For every world w ∈ W in Sc, and every formula A, w Sc A
iff A ∈ w (or equivalently ‖A‖Sc = [A]Sc).
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of the formula.
The inductive base is given by the basic condition on the valuation func-
tion for canonical models. Furthermore we consider only the case of modal
operators.
If w  EA, then by the evaluation function we have w ∈ f(‖A‖, w); by
the inductive hypothesis w ∈ f([A], w), thus w ∈ [EA], therefore EA ∈ w.
If EA ∈ w, then this implies that CA ∈ w and A ∈ w. Since w is
consistent A 6≡ ⊥ and [A] 6= ∅; thus f([A], w) = [EA] and consequently
w ∈ f([A], w). By the inductive hypothesis w ∈ f(‖A‖, w), which implies
w  EA.
If w  CA then f(‖A‖, w) 6= ∅, and by the inductive hypothesis f([A], w) 6=
∅; by construction this implies that CA ∈ w.
If CA ∈ w, then either f([A], w) = [EA] or f([A], w) =W−{w}. Clearly
A cannot be >, thus, according to Proposition 9, f([A], w) 6= ∅, and by the
inductive hypothesis so is f(‖A‖, w); therefore w  CA. 2
Lemma 11. Sc satisfies conditions E1, E2, and F1.
Proof. ¬C> is an axiom, so ¬C> ∈ w, for every world w; hence C> /∈ w. By
the construction of canonical models we have f([>], w) = ∅. Since [>] = W ,
we have f(W,w) = ∅.
If w ∈ f([A], w) ∩ f([B], w), then w ∈ f([A], w) and w ∈ f([B], w). This
means that [A] 6= ∅ and [B] 6= ∅. From this we obtain that EA ∈ w and
EB ∈ w. Consequently EA ∧ EB ∈ w and by the property of maximal
consistent sets E(A∧B) ∈ w. All we have to prove now is that [A∧B] 6= ∅.
To prove it we can use the same argument we have developed in the proof of
Theorem 7 when we have shown that EA ∧ EB → E(A ∧B) is valid.
If A ≡ ⊥ then either f([A], w) = W − {w} or f([A], w) = ∅. In both
cases w /∈ f([A], w). If A 6≡ ⊥, then, if CA ∈ w, f([A], w) = [EA]. But for
every world x if EA ∈ x then A ∈ x; therefore f([A], w) ⊆ [A]. On the other
hand, if CA /∈ w, then f([A], w) = ∅, thus, trivially f([A], w) ⊆ [A]. 2
From the two Lemmata above we obtain that L1 is complete with respect
to S .
Theorem 12. `L1 A iff S A.
7 Non-normal Worlds and Relational Models
In the previous sections we examined Elgesem’s modal logic of agency and
ability using semantics with different flavours. In general the selection func-
tion semantics and neighbourhood semantics give rise to the same structure:
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the selection function semantics focuses on the worlds where some actions
can be realised in relation to a given world, while the neighbourhood seman-
tics identifies the actions (formulas) that can be completed successfully in a
given world.
In Section 6 we proposed a characterisation of L1 based on models sat-
isfying condition F1. According to the intended reading f(∅, w) is the set
of worlds where the agent realises her ability to bring about an impossible
goal (whatever an impossible goal is). So in some senses, f(∅, w) corresponds
to a set of impossible or imaginary worlds8. At any rate, the technical ma-
chinery of impossible (non-normal, queer) worlds9 offers us the opportunity
to present an alternative class of Elgesem’s models for L1. All we have to
do is to supplement the set W of possible worlds with the impossible world
w⊥, to establish that for every formula A, w⊥  A, and to define validity
as validity at the normal worlds. The revised semantics makes explicit the
need for impossible worlds –after all, if we assume that agents might have
the ability to realise the impossible, it seems plausible to have a semantic
counterpart for this notion. Hansson and Ga¨rdenfors [14] point out that it is
possible to destroy the general dependency of modal operators on the under-
lying semantic structure (in the case at hand the selection function f , and the
accessibility relation R in relational models) by using non-normal/impossible
worlds obeying different logical rules.
Technically non-normal worlds deny the general idea behind intensional
semantics that the value of modal formulas at a world w depends on the
values of other formulas in other worlds, and validity is defined as validity at
the normal worlds. Although the philosophical intuition behind non-normal
worlds is sound, it commits us to postulate their existence; what is more
is that its treatment is rather unsatisfactory: they are taken as black-boxes
without any further analysis of their (internal) structure. In this way, we
fail to recognise the potential multiplicity of types of non-normal worlds. A
more appropriate solution is to recast the semantics with some more general
type of dependence relation between truth of modal formulas and truth in
other worlds [14].
8It is beyond the scope of the paper to give a characterisation of impossible worlds.
All we ask for is that non-normal/impossible worlds are worlds whose rules and laws are
different from the rules and laws of the normal worlds. In particular we assume that
impossible worlds are worlds where ⊥ is true, however they are impossible according to a
classical reading: thus, if ⊥ is true everything else is true, and a fortiori > is true. Thus
it is not possible to use > to discern possible worlds from impossible ones.
9Non-normal (or queer) worlds were introduced by Kripke in [22] to give a possible
world semantics to Lewis’ systems S2 and S3. Since then they have been used to provide
models for several non-normal and intensional logics.
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Scott-Montague models were devised, originally, to overcome the draw-
back of non-normal worlds we just have alluded to; but, for Elgesem’s models,
we have to reintroduce them, either implicitly or explicitly. If we have to re-
instate non-normal/impossible worlds in order to prevent ¬C⊥ to be valid in
Elgesem’s models, then we overstep the very own idea motivating this type
of semantics.
Since non-normal worlds are required, either implicitly –when condition
F1, which does not rule out the presence of impossible worlds in a model,
is assumed– or explicitly –when the impossible world w⊥ is introduced–,
in Elgesem’s models the advantages of using a selection function semantics
instead of relational models with non-normal worlds is lost. One could then
ask if it is possible to devise a relational model for L1 (and L2). In the rest
of this section we will investigate this issue.
Classical modal logics are characterised by models with the following
structure [10]:
〈W,N,R∗, v〉 (15)
where W , v are as before, N ⊆ W is the set of normal worlds, and R∗ is a
set of binary relations over N ×W . The valuation clause for 2 is
w  2A iff w ∈ N and ∃R ∈ R∗ such that ∀x(wRx iff x  A) (16)
The set of non-normal worlds is denoted by Q (where Q = W −N). Alter-
natively we could define a model as 〈W,Q,R∗, v〉. Clearly if w ∈ Q, for any
formula A, w 6 2A. Worlds in Q correspond to worlds in a neighbourhood
model with empty neighbourhoods.
Now to accommodate C and E we have to combine one model for the
E component and one model for the C component. Fortunately the two
operators are related by axiom A4, thus we can adopt the structure (from
now on we will use X as a variable ranging over C,E)
〈W,QE, QC , RE, RC , v〉 (17)
whereW is a set of possible worlds, QE and QC are sets of non-normal worlds
such that QC ⊆ QE, RE and RC are sets of binary relations with signature
W −QX ×W , and v is an assignment. Moreover
R1 ∀R ∈ RC∀w∃x¬(wRx) (all relations in RC are point-wise non-universal);
R2 ∀w /∈ QE∀R,S ∈ RE∃T ∈ RE such that Rw ∩Sw = Tw (RE is point-wise
closed under intersection);
R3 ∀R ∈ RE∀w(wRw) (all relations in RE are reflexive);
20
R4 ∀w /∈ QE∀R ∈ RE∃R′ ∈ RC such that Rw = R′w (the relations in RE are
sub-relations of relations in RC);
R5 ∀R ∈ RC∀w∃x(wRx) (all relations in RC are serial).
As we shall see, L1 is determined by the class of relational models satisfying
R1–R4, and L2 by R1–R5. To prove these results we are going to show
that for each relational model there is an equivalent neighbourhood model,
and for every (finite) neighbourhood model there is an equivalent relational
model.
Before proving this result we give an auxiliary lemma about sufficient
conditions to ensure the equivalence of relational and neighbourhood models.
In what follows we will use Rw, for R ∈ RX to denote the set of worlds
accessible from w using the relation R, formally: if R ∈ RX , then Rw =
{w′ ∈ W : wRw′}.
Lemma 13. Let N = 〈W,NE, NC , v〉 be a neighbourhood model and R =
〈W,QE, QC , RE, RC , v〉 be a relational model such that
1. ∀w ∈ W if NXw , then ∀x ∈ NXw ∃R ∈ RX such that x = Rw, and
2. ∀w ∈ W if w /∈ Q, then ∀R ∈ RX∃x ∈ NXw such that x = Rw.
Then for all formulas A: N A iff R A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. The two models
have the same set of possible worlds and the same assignment, thus they
agree on every propositional variable. For the inductive step we consider
only the cases of the modal operators.
w N XA ⇒ ‖A‖N ∈ NXw
⇒ NXw 6= ∅
⇒ w /∈ QX
⇒ ∃R ∈ RX : Rw = ‖A‖N = ‖A‖R
⇒ ∃R ∈ RX∀x(wRx iff x R A)
⇒ w R XA.
For the other direction we have
w R A ⇒ w /∈ Q and ∃R ∈ RX∀x(wRx iff x R A)
⇒ Rw = ‖A‖R = ‖A‖N
⇒ Rw ∈ NXw
⇒ ‖A‖N ∈ NXw
⇒ w N XA.
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For every relational model we can generate an equivalent neighbourhood
model where NXw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RX
}
. For the other direction, on the other
hand, we have to be careful. Besides the constraints dictated by the internal
structure of the model we have to ensure that the set of relations generated
from NEw is closed under intersection and the relations are serial if we want
to satisfy R5. The idea is the same as in the other direction: we use the sets
in NXw to create instances of relations in R
X . Here the problem is that given
two worlds w and w′ it is very likely that |NEw | 6= |NEw′|; hence w generates
|NEw | sub-relations and w′ generates |NEw′| sub-relations, thus there are sub-
relations without elements in relation with w. A simple solution to obviate
this problem is to pick a fixed but arbitrary x ∈ NEw for all the additional
relations.
Theorem 14.
1. For every (finite) relational model M there is an equivalent (finite)
neighbourhood model N such that if R satisfies Rn then N satisfies
Cn (for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5).
2. For every finite neighbourhood model N there is an equivalent finite
relational model R such that if N satisfies Cn then R satisfies Rn
(for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5).
Proof. First of all the models will have the same set of worlds and the same
assignment, thus all we have to show is that it is possible to generate appropri-
ate sets of relations from the given neighbourhood functions and appropriate
neighbourhood functions from the given sets of relations.
Part 1. Given a (finite) relational model R we can generate an equivalent
(finite) neighbourhood model as follows:
• If w ∈ QX then NXw = ∅; otherwise
• NXw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RX
}
.
It is immediate to verify that the conditions of Lemma 13 are satisfied by
the models obtained from the above construction; therefore the generated
models are equivalent to the generating models.
Case R1⇒ C1. According to the construction we have thatNCw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RC
}
,
but given R1 for every w and every R, Rw 6= W , thus W /∈ NCw .
Case R2 ⇒ C2. Condition R2 states that for each world w, the set of the
projections of the relations over w is closed under intersection. NEw is the
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set of all projections of the relations in RE over w, thus NEw is closed under
intersection.
Case R3 ⇒ C3. Each R ∈ RE is reflexive, then for every normal world
w, w ∈ Rw; by construction NEw is the set of all Rw. Therefore for every
X ∈ NEw , w ∈ X. If w is a non-normal world then NEw = ∅ and C3 is
vacuously satisfied.
Case R4 ⇒ C4. If w ∈ QE then, by construction, NEw = ∅, and for every
set NCw , N
E
w ⊆ NCw . In case w ∈ QC , then also w ∈ QE, and we can repeat
the previous argument. If w /∈ QE we have that NCw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RE
}
, but,
by condition 4 there is a relation R′ ∈ RC such that Rw = R′w. This implies
that w /∈ QC , and so NEw ⊆ NCw .
Case R5⇒ C5. According to the construction we have thatNCw =
{
Rw : R ∈ RC
}
,
but given R5 for every w /∈ QC and every R, Rw 6= ∅, thus ∅ /∈ NCw .
Part 2. To build a finite relation model from a finite neighbourhood model
we use the following construction.
For each NEw and N
C
w let Σ
E
w and Σ
C
w be sequences of all the elements in
NEw and N
C
w such that if i ≤ |NEw |, then ΣEw,i = ΣCw,i (we use ΣXw,i to indicate
the i-th element of ΣXw ). Moreover
e = max
{|NEw | : w ∈ W} c = max{|NCw | : w ∈ W} .
Then
RE =
⋃
1≤i≤e
REi R
C =
⋃
1≤i≤c
RCi
where
REi =
{
(w,w′) : w /∈ QE and w′ ∈ α(w, i)}
RCi =
{
(w,w′) : w /∈ QC and w′ ∈ γ(w, i)}
where α and γ are partial functions with signature α : W × N 7→ NE and
γ : W × N 7→ NC such that:
α(w, i) =

undefined if i > e or NEw = ∅
ΣEw,i if i ≤ |NEw |
ΣEw,1 otherwise
and
γ(w, i) =

undefined if i > e+ c or NCw = ∅
ΣCw,i if i ≤ |NEw |
ΣCw,i−e+|NCw | if e < i ≤ e+ |NCw | − |NEw |
ΣCw,1 otherwise
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It is easy to verify that the models obtained from the above construction
obey to the conditions of Lemma 16; consequently this construction produces
equivalent models.
Case C1 ⇒ R1. Let us suppose it does not hold. This means there is a
relation S ∈ RC such that there is a world w that is in relation with all the
worlds, i.e., Sw = W . Since S ∈ RC and Sw 6= ∅, then w /∈ QC , and for some
i, Sw = β(w, i) = Σ
C
w,i, but this implies that Sw ∈ NCw , and thus W ∈ NCw
when we obtain a contradiction.
Case C2 ⇒ R2. By construction, for any w /∈ QX and R ∈ RX , Rw cor-
responds to some set R ∈ NXw , and for every set S ∈ NXw there is a rela-
tion S ∈ RX such that Sw = S. Thus for any two relations R,S ∈ RE,
Rw, Sw ∈ NEw . Since NEw is closed under intersection Rw ∩ Sw ∈ NEw ; again,
by construction, there is a relation T such that Tw = Rw ∩ Sw.
Case C3 ⇒ R3. If NEw = ∅ then w ∈ QE and the condition does not apply
to it. Otherwise we have that each relation REi is based on Σ
E
w,i if i ≤ |NEw |
or ΣEw,1 otherwise. In both cases condition Σ
E
w,x ∈ NEw and condition C3
guarantee that w ∈ ΣEw,x. Thus (w,w) ∈ REi , which implies that every
relation R ∈ RE is reflexive.
Case C4 ⇒ R4. Since NEw ⊆ NCw and, by hypothesis, W is finite, |NEw | ≤
|NCw |. By construction there are e relations RE and c relations RC (with
e ≤ c). By construction, for i ≤ |NEw |, α(w, i) = γ(w, i), i.e., ΣEw,i = ΣCw,i.
Notice that for each relation Rw = Σ
X
w,i for some i ∈ N. Hence we can
conclude that for every relation R ∈ RE there is a relation R′ ∈ RC such
that Rw = R
′
w.
Case C5 ⇒ R5. Let us suppose it does not hold. This means there is a
relation S ∈ RC such that there is a world that is in relation with no worlds,
i.e., Sw = ∅. Since S ∈ RC , then w /∈ QC , and for some i, Sw = β(w, i) =
ΣCw,i, but this implies that Sw ∈ NCw , and thus ∅ ∈ NCw when we obtain a
contradiction. 2
Due to the above procedure to generate such relational models, in the case of
infinite N or N ′ models we would get non-enumerable infinitary relational
structures. To avoid these complexities, it is sufficient to considerN andN ′
when they are finite. This is possible by preliminarily showing that L1 and
L2 have the finite model property wrt the neighbourhood models previously
defined. The fmp follows immediately from the results of Lewis [23] and [34]
that every classical non-iterative modal logic has the finite model property.10
10A modal logic is non-iterative iff it can be axiomatised by using only non-iterative
axioms. A formula (axiom) A is non-iterative iff for every subformula 2iB/3iB of A, B
does not contain a modal operator.
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Clearly L1 and L2 are non-iterative thus we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. L1 and L2 have the fmp.
We can now prove the completeness of the L1 and L2 with respect to the
relational models developed in this section.
Theorem 16. Let R1 be a relational model satisfying R1–R4, and R2 be a
relational model satisfying R1–R5; then
1. `L1 A iff R1 A;
2. `L2 A iff R2 A.
Proof. Let us consider only L1. From Theorem 3 we know that
N A→ `L1 A,
which is equivalent to saying that
6`L1 A→ 6N A.
Since L1 has the finite model property, there is a finite model NFIN and a
world w in it such that
w NFIN ¬A
According to Proposition 14 and the generation of the corresponding rela-
tional model
w R1 ¬A
which implies
6R1 A
Then,
6`L1 A→ 6R1 A
and so
R1 A ⇐⇒ `L1 A
The proof for L2 and R2 is analogous. 2
Here we want to propose a simple interpretation of relational models: the
capability of an agent to realise a particular state A depends on her ability
to perform some actions in the situation described by the then actual world.
Accordingly each accessibility relation corresponds to a concrete action. In
this perspective non-normal worlds are just situations where an agent has no
possibility to perform any action.
25
8 Discussion
When we consider the semantics developed by Elgesem we have to notice
that he uses only one selection function to represent the two modal operators
instead of the two neighbourhood functions of Section n5. This amounts to
saying that Elgesem considers agency and ability as two facets of the same
phenomenon –the phenomenon described by the selection function. Thus to
discern the two concepts he has to adopt two different valuation clauses. In
particular the condition for E is the condition for a 2 operator, while that
for C is the condition used for a 3 operator. However these conditions, in
the context of non-normal modal logic, do not imply that 3 is the dual of
2. On the contrary the neighbourhood semantics assumes two separate but
related modal operators.
It is true that selection function models are widely used in conditional log-
ics and with different evaluation clauses for modal operators they are just a
“notational” variant of neighbourhood models (indeed they are both classified
as Scott-Montague semantics). However Elgesem models are not standard
in modal logic; the particular evaluation clauses for modal operators make
Elgesem semantics different from standard selection function semantics for
modal logic. Accordingly the construction of canonical models requires some
ingenuity, and it is not a straightforward extension of standard construction
of canonical models –in particular when the condition F1 is involved. As
we have seen this condition is used to discriminate Elgesem models rejecting
¬C⊥ from models validating it. But this condition is relevant not only for
this axiom but it is entangled with some other conditions. The proofs of
soundness and completeness (Theorems 7 and 10) make essential use of this
condition in the case of agglomeration for E. The axioms are clearly indepen-
dent, but the semantic conditions are, in a certain sense, entangled together
by the use of the same selection function to characterise two independent
but related modal operators. Interestingly the connection is broken when we
explicitly introduce non-normal worlds in Elgesem model to characterise L2
(see the introduction to Section 7). Moreover condition F1 makes clear the
implicit need of non-normal worlds.
[25], among others, argues that an agent can carry out an action success-
fully if she has the ability as well as the opportunity do to it. Indeed Elgesem
studies the relationships between ability and agency, and he correctly realises
that agency implies opportunity, i.e., EA→ OpportunityEA. But the notion
of opportunity is given in terms of agency, i.e., OpportunityA ≡ (E¬A∨A).
Therefore we believe that the semantics proposed by Elgesem does not fully
capture the idea that agency consists of ability plus opportunity since those
three notions are represented by the same selection function. On the con-
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trary the other semantics do recognise that ability alone is not enough to
represent agency and that it has to be supplemented by something else.
Finally, as we said, Elgesem’s semantics leads to the introduction (ei-
ther implicitly or explicitly) of non-normal worlds. This can be shown if we
compare the reasons why the schema ¬C⊥ is valid in Elgesem’s logic to the
conditions we have to impose to regain completeness, in this semantics, and
not to adopt such as schema. As we have seen, this last is valid in Elgesem’s
original semantics simply because from f(X,w) ⊆ X and ‖⊥‖E = ∅, we get
f(‖⊥‖E , w) = ∅. Recall that, intuitively, f(X,w) is interpreted as the set
of worlds where the agent realises the ability she has in w to bring about
X. Thus agency and ability refer to the same set of worlds selected by f : if
it is impossible to have the ability to achieve ⊥ so it is similarly impossible
to achieve it. If we look at the conditions that allow us to regain complete-
ness without accepting (7) we realise that condition F1 confines the inclusion
f(X,w) ⊆ X only to the cases where X 6= ∅; otherwise, w 6∈ f(X,w). Notice
that, strictly speaking, this condition does not exclude that there is one world
w where ⊥ holds, but simply that, if such a world exists, it is not picked out
by f(X,w). This w, if it exists, is nothing but an impossible world; therefore
if there is a second world x such that w ∈ f(∅, x), then x is a non-normal
world. This idea seems to be confirmed by focusing on another alternative.
In fact, the validity of (7) in Elgesem’s original semantics results from the
condition f(X,w) ⊆ X, applied to any X, and from using a single selection
function for both C and E. Thus, let us suppose to define two different func-
tions fE and fC as in standard Scott-Montague selection function models.
Following Elgesem, we will simply state that fE(X,w) ⊆ X for any X, and,
in virtue of (6), that fE(X,w) ⊆ fC(X,w). As in Elgesem’s approach, we
will obtain fE(‖⊥‖E , w) = ∅, but this will not imply that the same holds for
fC . This means that schema (7) is not required and that the set of worlds
picked out by fC for a world w may include a world x where an agent is
able to do ⊥; hence w is a non-normal world, as we argued. To sum up,
the semantical implication we have to accept if we want to adopt Elgesem’s
strategy –using one selection function to represent E and C and having full
reflexivity for E– is that of excluding non-normal worlds: we have necessarily
to adopt (7). Otherwise, we may change strategy but this requires (either
implicitly or explicitly) the existence of non-normal worlds. The first option
is of course sound, as we argumented in Section 4 with regard to the idea
of practical agency. However, it is not the only available because different
interpretations may be assigned to the idea of agency.
On the other hand, as we argued, the introduction of non-normal worlds
within Elgesem’s semantics is not the best choice as their interpretation is
not fully satisfactory; on the contrary, the interpretation we have proposed
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for non-normal worlds seems to fit nicely with the intended reading of the
accessibility relations for this type of logics. This is the advantage of multi-
relational semantics, which allows to avoid that non-normal worlds are like
black-boxes, as we said, namely entities without any further analysis of their
(internal) structure. This semantics, on the other hand, does not lend itself
to easy manipulation and calculation. Neighbourhood models are quite the
opposite: they are easier to manipulate and work with for non-iterative logic,
even though they are not particularly intuitive. Both aspects are mainly due
to their close relationships with algebraic semantics for modal logic. Elge-
sem’s semantics, at the end, is simple and provides an intuitive interpretation,
but it is not transparent to extensions. Hidden semantic relationships can ap-
pear when such a semantics is extended: two examples we have seen here are
the role played by reflexivity in making L1 incomplete, and the relationships
between ¬C⊥ and agglomeration for E.
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